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Abstract: We show that the optimal consumption of an individual over the life cycle
can have the hump shape (inverted U-shape) observed empirically if the preferences of
the individual exhibit internal habit formation. In the absence of habit formation, an
impatient individual would prefer a decreasing consumption path over life. However,
because of habit formation, a high initial consumption would lead to high required
consumption in the future. To cover the future required consumption, wealth is set aside,
but the necessary amount decreases with age which allows consumption to increase in
the early part of life. At some age, the impatience outweighs the habit concerns so
that consumption starts to decrease. We derive the optimal consumption strategy in
closed form, deduce sucient conditions for the presence of a consumption hump, and
characterize the age at which the hump occurs. Numerical examples illustrate our
ndings. We show that our model calibrates well to U.S. consumption data from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey.
Keywords: Consumption hump, life-cycle utility maximization, habit formation,
impatience
JEL subject codes: D91, D11, D141 Introduction
Empirical studies have documented that the consumption expenditures of individuals typically have
an inverted U-shape over the life cycle by being increasing up to age 45-50 years and then decreasing
over the remaining life. Standard, frictionless consumption-savings model cannot generate such a
hump in consumption: if the subjective time preference rate of the individual is higher [lower] than
the (risk-adjusted expected) return on investments, consumption is expected to decrease [increase]
monotonically over the entire life time. Several plausible models that lead to a consumption hump
have been suggested (see below), but these models are relatively complex and can only be solved
with the help of numerical methods. This paper shows that, even in a very simple setting, the
consumption hump can naturally emerge when the preferences of the individual exhibit habit
formation instead of the time-additivity typically assumed.
The hump in life-cycle consumption emerges from a trade-o between impatience and the impli-
cations of habits. Suppose the individual has a high subjective time preference rate and thus, other
things equal, would prefer to have a decreasing consumption pattern over life. However, if the in-
dividual forms enduring habits for consumption, she knows that a high initial consumption would
lead to higher required consumption in the future. Consequently, she trades o the impatience
regarding current consumption with the concerns about the future required consumption levels
resulting from habit formation. The younger the individual, the more money has to be set aside to
cover future required consumption. A suciently strong habit formation dominates the impatience
in the early years, but as habit concerns decrease over life consumption gradually increases in the
early years. At some age, the impatience outweighs the habit concerns so that consumption starts
to decrease. Hence, the consumption pattern over the life cycle exhibits a hump.
The tradeo between impatience and habit formation is fundamental, and we illustrate it in
the simplest possible model with full certainty and no frictions. The individual is equipped with
some initial wealth that can be invested at a constant risk-free rate. The individual can continu-
ously withdraw funds for consumption. We assume that the individual's objective is to maximize
utility of consumption over the remaining life. The utility at a given point in time is a concave
power function of the dierence between consumption and the habit level at that time, where the
habit level is a scaled, exponentially weighted average of past consumption rates of the individual.
This standard specication of habit-style preferences implies that the habit level is the minimum
feasible consumption and, therefore, the individual must ensure to have sucient funds to cover
1the minimum feasible consumption in the remaining life. This generates required savings which
are, other things equal, decreasing as the remaining life-time shrinks.
The optimal consumption prole and the possibility of a hump in consumption depend on the
values of various parameters of the model. We derive a set of sucient conditions for the presence
of a consumption hump. For a reasonable parametrization of the model, we show that the optimal
consumption prole of the agent does exhibit a hump and that the consumption hump occurs at an
age consistent with the empirical evidence. We illustrate how the location of the hump is aected
by the various parameters in a way consistent with economic intuition. For example, we nd that
the bigger the impact of current consumption on future habit levels (via a higher scaling parameter
and a lower decay rate of the habit level), the later the consumption hump occurs. Moreover,
consumers who are very impatient or very risk-tolerant (i.e., consumers having a high elasticity of
intertemporal substitution) have a consumption prole peaking at a relatively young age.
We calibrate our model to consumption data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey in the
United States over the period 1980-2003. We nd that our model matches very well the observed
hump-shaped consumption pattern of both singles and couples.
The habit formation we model is sometimes referred to as internal habit formation to emphasize
that the habit level entering the utility function is a result of the past consumption choices of the
same individual. This can be contrasted with the case of subsistence consumption in which the
individual derives utility from consumption above some exogenously given subsistence level and also
to the case of external habit formation in which the individual's utility of consumption depends on
some external factor, e.g., the consumption choices of peers (\keeping up with the Jones'es") or
the per capita consumption in the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
presents the model and provides a closed-form solution for the optimal consumption plan. Analyt-
ical results on the existence and location of the consumption hump are demonstrated in Section 4.
Section 5 illustrates the optimal consumption prole for a set of benchmark parameter values and
discusses the sensitivity with respect to the values of key parameters. Section 7 concludes. Proofs
can be found in the appendices.
22 Literature review
Thurow (1969) appears to be the rst to empirically document a hump in life-cycle consumption,
i.e., that consumption over life has an inverted U-shape. Later studies using dierent data sources
and periods conrm this pattern, see, e.g., Attanasio and Weber (1995), Attanasio, Banks, Meghir,
and Weber (1999), Browning and Crossley (2001), and Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
The life-cycle consumption-saving theory builds on work by Ramsey (1928), Fisher (1930),
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), and Friedman (1957) and was extended to rigorously incorporate
uncertainty by Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969, 1971). Without frictions, such models produce
an optimal life-cycle consumption pattern which is either monotonically increasing, monotonically
decreasing, or 
at depending on whether the subjective time preference rate of the individual is
smaller than, greater than, or equal to the (risk-adjusted expected) return on investments.
Known explanations of the consumption hump include borrowing constraints (Thurow 1969),
income uncertainty and precautionary savings (Nagatani 1972; Carroll 1997), endogenous labor sup-
ply with hump-shaped wages (Heckman 1974), variations in household size (Attanasio and Brown-
ing 1995; Browning and Ejrns 2009), mortality risk (Feigenbaum 2008; Hansen and _ Imrohoro glu
2008), and consumer durables serving as collateral (Fern andez-Villaverde and Krueger 2011). Our
purpose is not to question any of these explanations, but rather to add a new, simple explanation
of the hump. The formal models in the above-listed papers are all built on the maximization of
time-additive utility of one good or two goods (with leisure or durables as the second good). The
constraints, collateral, unspanned income risk, and mortality risk in these models make it dicult
to derive the optimal consumption strategy in closed form. By relying on habit formation in prefer-
ences, we set up a simple model in which we derive a closed-form solution for optimal consumption
and show that optimal consumption can exhibit a hump over the life cycle.
Economists have long recognized that preferences may not be intertemporally separable. Ac-
cording to Browning (1991), this idea dates back to the 1890 book \Principles of Economics"
by Alfred Marshall. Ravina (2007) reports strong support of internal habit formation based on
consumption decisions of a sample of U.S. credit card holders in the period 1999-2002. The con-
sequences of habit formation have been studied formally at least since Ryder and Heal (1973).
Regarding individual decision making, the literature has so far focused on the impact of habit
formation on portfolio choice (Ingersoll 1992; Munk 2008), whereas we consider the implications
for consumption.
3Habit features in preferences have proven helpful in explaining stylized asset pricing facts that
seem puzzling when agents are assumed to have time-separable power utility, see, e.g., Sundaresan
(1989), Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and Menzly, Santos,
and Veronesi (2004). Based on an endowment economy with identical agents, Grischenko (2010)
concludes that an internal habit specication provides a better match with asset pricing data than
an external habit specication. Heaton (1995) and Chen and Ludvigson (2009) report similar
results. Habit formation is also used in other areas of macroeconomics, see, e.g., Carroll, Overland,
and Weil (2000), Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001), and Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and
Wouters (2007). Fuhrer (2000) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) show that habit
formation may explain the hump-shaped response over time of aggregate consumption to a monetary
policy shock. In contrast, we show that habit formation may lead to (expected) consumption being
hump-shaped over the life of an individual.
3 The model
We set up a deterministic, continuous-time model of an individual's life-cycle consumption and
savings decisions. The individual enters the economy at time 0 with some initial wealth X0 and
lives until time T > 0, which we assume is a known constant. The individual consumes a single
consumption good with c(t) representing the consumption rate at time t, so that the number of
goods consumed over a short interval [t;t+dt] is approximately c(t)dt. The good is the numeraire
in the economy. The wealth not spent on consumption is invested in a savings account that oers
a constant, risk-free rate of r, continuously compounded. The individual receives no other income
during life than the interest on savings. The dynamics of wealth X(t) is then simply
dX(t) = rX(t)dt   c(t)dt: (1)
The individual has to determine a consumption strategy (c(t))t2[0;T], which in our deterministic
setting is simply a function c : [0;T] 7! R:
We assume that the preferences of the individual exhibit (internal) habit formation. We dene
the time t habit level to be
h(t) = h0e t + 
Z t
0
e (t s)c(s)ds; (2)
4where h0, , and  are non-negative constants. The last term is proportional to a weighted average
of past consumption where we can interpret  as a persistence parameter and  as a scaling
parameter. Finally, h0  0 is an initial habit level whose in
uence fades away over time provided
that  > 0. Note that the habit level evolves as
dh(t) = (c(t)   h(t))dt: (3)
Given a wealth of x and a habit level of h at time t, the individual is assumed to evaluate a
given consumption strategy c = (c(s))s2[t;T] over the remaining life by
Jc(t;x;h) =
Z T
t
e (s t)U (c(s)   h(s)) ds + "e (T t)U (X(T)); (4)
where  is a constant subjective time preference rate, "  0 is a constant indicating the preference
weight of the bequest XT relative to consumption, and
U(z) =
1
1   

z1 
 (5)
where 
 > 1 is a risk aversion parameter. The relative risk aversion with respect to consumption
gambles is  c
@2U(c h)
@c2 =
@U(c h)
@c = 
c=(c h) so that 
 is the minimal relative risk aversion possible.
The indirect utility function is dened as
J(t;x;h) = max
c Jc(t;x;h): (6)
As we want to illustrate in the simplest possible setting that habit formation can induce a consump-
tion habit, we deliberately assume full certainty in our model. Hence, the concept of risk aversion
may seem misplaced, but we can alternatively think in terms of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, which is the reciprocal of the relative risk aversion, i.e., (c h)=(
c). A higher 
 rep-
resents a lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution and 1=
 is the maximal level of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution.1 For terminological convenience we will continue to refer to 
 as a
risk aversion parameter in the remainder of the paper.
The setup requires that consumption stays above the habit level, otherwise the marginal utility
1An alternative measure of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is the derivative of the consumption growth
rate with respect to the interest rate. The two measures are identical in the setting without habit formation, but not
in the setting with habit formation as explained by Constantinides (1990) in the case of an innite time horizon.
5would be innite. This implies that wealth at any point in time has to be sucient to nance
future minimum consumption. If the individual has a time t habit level of h(t) and consumes at
the minimum level (i.e., habit level) in all future so that c(s) = h(s), the habit level evolves as
dh(s) =  (   )h(s)ds which implies that
h(s) = e ( )(s t)h(t); s 2 [t;T]:
The time t present value of this stream of minimum future consumption is
Z T
t
e r(s t)h(s)ds = h(t)A(t);
where
A(t) =
8
> <
> :
T   t; if rA = 0;
1
rA

1   e rA(T t)

; otherwise;
(7)
with
rA = r +    :
Remark 1. It seems natural to expect that  >  since then the habit level decreases whenever the
agent consumes at the minimum level as can be seen by applying c(t) = h(t) in (3). If, furthermore,
the interest rate is non-negative, the constant rA is denitely positive.
Intuitively, the individual can split up her time t wealth into tied-up wealth h(t)A(t), which
covers the minimum future consumption, and the free wealth X(t)   h(t)A(t) which can nance
excess consumption and thus generates utility. This explains the form of the solution to the utility
maximization problem. The following theorem gives the exact formulation. See Appendix A for a
proof.
Theorem 1. Assume x > hA(t). Then the indirect utility function is given by
J(t;x;h) =
1
1   

g(t)
(x   hA(t))1 
; (8)
6where A is given by (7) and
g(t) =
Z T
t
e rg(s t)(1 + A(s))

 1

 ds + "
1

e rg(T t); (9)
rg =

   1


r +



:
The optimal consumption strategy is
c(t) = h(t) +
X(t)   h(t)A(t)
g(t)
(1 + A(t))
  1

: (10)
In the following, we are mainly interested in the shape of the function t 7! c(t).
Let us brie
y consider some special cases. First, consider the case with constant relative risk
aversion which requires h0 =  =  = 0. In this case optimal consumption is simply c(t) =
X(t)=g(t) and, since X0(t) = (r   g(t) 1)X(t) and g0(t) = rgg(t)   1, we obtain
c0(t) =
(r   rg)X(t)
g(t)
=
r   


X(t)
g(t)
: (11)
Hence, we see that the consumption function is increasing if r >  (the return on savings exceeds
the impatience), decreasing if r < , and 
at if  = r. Secondly, consider the case where the
consumption benchmark h(t) is an exogenously given function (an external habit or a subsistence
consumption level) and, in particular,  = 0 so that consumption does not aect future values
of h(t). In this case optimal consumption becomes
c(t) = h(t) +
X(t)   F(t)
g(t)
; F(t) =
Z T
t
e r(s t)h(s)ds; (12)
where g is given by (9) albeit with  = 0 and we must require X(t) > F(t). Then
c0(t) = h0(t) +
r   


X(t)   F(t)
g(t)
; (13)
which is decreasing if h is decreasing and  > r, but can be increasing under other assumptions.
With a suitably specied benchmark function h(t), the optimal consumption path can even exhibit
a hump.
Now we return to the case with (internal) habit formation. Note that direct dierentiation with
respect to time in (10) would involve the derivatives of both h(t) and X(t), but the latter can be
7expressed in terms of X(t) and c(t) through (1) and then the X(t) can be expressed in terms of
c(t) and h(t) using (10). Hence, the derivative of c(t) can be expressed in terms of c(t) and h(t).
From (3), the derivative of h(t) can be expressed in terms of c(t) and h(t). In fact, it turns out to
be useful to rewrite the system of derivatives of c(t) and h(t) as a system of derivatives of c(t) and
the surplus consumption dened as
(t) = c(t)   h(t): (14)
Note that the optimal consumption strategy is such that the surplus consumption is a time-
dependent fraction of the free wealth. We summarize the derivatives in the following theorem,
which is proved in Appendix B.
Theorem 2. The dynamics of the optimal consumption and the associated surplus consumption is
given by the system
d(t) = (t)(t)dt; (15)
dc(t) = ( + (t))(t)dt   (   )c(t)dt; (16)
where
(t) =
r    + B(t)


; (17)
B(t) =
1   rAA(t)
1 + A(t)
=
8
> > <
> > :
1
1 + (T   t)
; if rA = 0;
rA
(rA + )erA(T t)   
; otherwise:
(18)
In the next section we provide analytical results on the existence and location of a hump in the
consumption function t 7! c(t). Section 5 illustrates the results by numerical examples.
4 Analytical results on the consumption hump
While the expression (10) for optimal consumption appears simple, note that it depends both on
h(t), which is determined by the entire consumption path up to time t via (2), and on wealth, which
also is determined by past consumption via (1). In general it seems very dicult to analytically
establish conditions under which consumption is hump-shaped.
8For long horizons, however, we can obtain an analytical characterization of the consumption
pattern and establish sucient conditions for the existence of a consumption hump. As explained
in the introduction, the hump emanates from a combination of habit formation and an impatience
exceeding returns on savings. In light of Remark 1, the following assumption is therefore natural.
Assumption 1. The parameters satisfy the conditions  > r,  > 0, and rA = r +     > 0.
Recall that the condition  > r requires the agent to be suciently impatient so that the
consumption in the absence of habit formation would be monotonically decreasing over life. The
condition  > 0 means that the habit level is increasing in past consumption so that preferences
exhibit genuine habit formation.
With  > 0, it is clear from (17) and (18) that both B(t) and (t) smoothly approach constants
as the terminal time T is increased. For T large enough, the graph of (t) is almost 
at in the
early years. With rA > 0, the limit of (t) as T ! 1 is (r   )=
. Dene the constant
 =
   r


;
which can be interpreted as the product of a net impatience rate    r and the maximal elasticity
of intertemporal substitution 1=
. By Assumption 1, we have  > 0. We now replace (t) in the
true dynamics (15) of the surplus consumption with its limit (r )=
 =   and thus consider the
time-independent dynamics
d~ (t) =  ~ (t)dt; (19)
d~ c(t) = (   )~ (t)dt   (   )~ c(t)dt (20)
with initial values ~ c0 > ~ 0 > 0. We demonstrate in numerical examples in Section 5 that the
time-independent dynamics (19){(20) is an accurate approximation of the true dynamics (15){(16)
except possibly for the nal years. See also Lemma 1 below.
The next theorem establishes conditions under which the approximating dynamics produce a
unique hump in the function ~ c(t). Appendix C provides the proof.
Theorem 3. Suppose Assumption 1 is satised and that
 >  + ; (21)
(   )~ c0 > (   )~ h0; (22)
9where ~ h0 = ~ c0   ~ 0. Then the solution to the dynamic system (19){(20) is such that the function
~ c(t) has a unique hump at t = tH, where
tH =
ln(   )   ln() + ln

1   ~ c0
(~ c0 ~ h0)

      
; (23)
and where
 =
   
      
: (24)
We emphasize that the parameter conditions stated in Theorem 3 are sucient, not necessary,
for the presence of a hump.
The condition (21) requires the decay rate  of the habit to be suciently high so that the habit
is not too persistent. Note that  > 0 since  > r, so the condition (21) sharpens the inequality
 >  which is natural, cf. Remark 1. If we assume  >  and ~ c0 = c0, the inequality (22) can be
rewritten, by applying (10) at t = 0, as
X0 >

A(0) +
   
   
g(0)(1 + A(0))1=


~ h0;
so that it is satised for a large enough initial wealth. Note that the parameter conditions stated
in the theorem ensure that the log-terms in (23) are well-dened.
The hump derived from the approximate dynamics occurs at age tH. Note that, for xed initial
values ~ c0 and ~ h0, tH is independent of the horizon T of the agent. This observation highlights that
the above theorem is relevant for the hump in the truly optimal consumption path if the horizon
is suciently large and, in particular, larger than tH. We nd that tH is increasing in ~ c0. Holding
~ c0 xed, we nd that tH is increasing in r, 
, and , but decreasing in ~ h0, , and .
The following lemma shows that we can bound the dierence between the true consumption
function and the approximation over any interval [0;t] by any margin  > 0 if the planning horizon
T is long enough. The proof can be found in Appendix D.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 1 and the conditions (21) and (22) hold. Let ~ h0 = h0 and ~ c0 = c0.
For any given t  0 and any given  > 0, we can nd ~ T > 0 such that if T > ~ T then
jc(s)   ~ c(s)j < ; s 2 [0;t]: (25)
By applying the lemma for t > tH and a small , we see that the true dynamics also give rise
10to a consumption hump if the stated parameter conditions are satised and the horizon T is long
enough.
In Section 5 we show in numerical examples that the approximate dynamics is very close to the
true dynamics over most of life even for realistic horizons, and we therefore also see a consumption
hump in such cases.
5 Numerical examples
In the following numerical examples we use the benchmark parameter values listed in Table 1 unless
otherwise mentioned. We assume the agent has a remaining time horizon of 50 years, so the setting
could represent the problem faced by an agent who is initially 30 years old and who lives until an
age of 80. The agent has no utility of bequests.2 The initial wealth is set to X0 = 20 which is
motivated by the observation that the median wealth for individuals of age 30-40 in the 2007 Survey
of Consumer Finances is roughly USD 20,000. The benchmark values of the interest rate, the time
preference rate, and the risk aversion parameter fall in the range considered in the literature. The
initial value of the relative risk aversion 
c0=(c0   h0) turns out to be around 9. The initial habit
level is set at 0.25 which, compared to the initial consumption level that turns out to be 0.45,
represents a signicant but not extremely strong habit; the initial consumption is approximately
44% above the minimum consumption level which is identical to the habit level. The values of
the habit parameters  and  are less clear given the limited literature. We consider values in the
range also studied by Constantinides (1990) and Munk (2008), which seem to generate reasonable
habit dynamics.
[Table 1 about here.]
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal consumption path with the benchmark parameter values. Con-
sumption exhibits a distinct hump with a maximum after 20.3 years, which could correspond to an
age of roughly 50 years, cf. the above discussion. This location of the hump matches well the em-
pirically observed hump. Based on the analytical approximation the hump time is tH  19:8 years,
very close to the actual time of the hump. We can see that the consumption pattern based on
the approximate, long-horizon dynamics (thin curve) is virtually indistinguishable from the actual
consumption pattern over the rst 30 years. The consumption levels are unrealistically low as we
2This is in line with Hurd (1989) who shows empirically that bequest motives in various countries are close to
zero.
11do not take labor income into account, but a quick x is to scale initial wealth appropriately to
incorporate human capital, which leads to a similar scaling of consumption levels (provided that
the initial habit level is scaled accordingly). This procedure does not aect the shape of the con-
sumption path, nor the presence and location of the hump. The habit level tracks the consumption
path closely.
Figure 1 further shows the monotonically decreasing consumption path of an agent not develop-
ing habits, but having a constant relative risk aversion (i.e., a constant elasticity of intertemporal
substitution). As explained below Theorem 1, this is a consequence of  exceeding r so that im-
patience beats returns on savings. Note the dramatic impact habit formation has on the optimal
consumption path.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Next we investigate the sensitivity of the consumption path and the location of the consumption
hump with respect to the values of key parameters. Figure 2 shows the optimal consumption prole
for three dierent values of the habit scaling parameter . Increasing , current consumption has a
bigger eect on future habit levels, which leads the agent to lower consumption in the early years.
The increased savings are spent on higher consumption in the late years of life. Consequently, the
consumption hump occurs later in life. For very small values of  (in our case around 0.1 and
smaller), the consumption prole is monotonically decreasing over life (except for a small increase
in the nal couple of years), as in the case without habits, since then the habit level does not have
a sucient magnitude to subdue the impatience of the agent. Conversely, for very high values of 
(in our case around 0.35 and higher), the consumption prole is monotonically increasing.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 3 illustrates the importance of the habit persistence parameter . A higher  means
reduced in
uence of current consumption on future habit levels. Hence, the agent initially consumes
more, which is naturally oset by lower consumption late in life. A higher  therefore also leads
to an earlier consumption hump. If  is suciently high (around 0.85 and higher in our case), the
hump disappears and consumption monotonically decreases over life except for the few nal years
where consumption increases. If  is suciently small (0.37 or lower), the optimal consumption is
monotonically increasing over life.
[Figure 3 about here.]
12The role of the time preference rate  can be seen in Figure 4. A higher  means that the
agent is more impatient and therefore increases consumption early in life with the consequence of
reducing consumption late in life, which also causes the consumption hump to occur earlier in life.
Because a high early consumption raises the minimum consumption level in the following years,
it takes an extremely high value of  (in our case 1.10 or higher) before the consumption path
becomes downward-sloping right from the beginning. For low values of  (around 0.035 and lower),
the optimal consumption prole is monotonically increasing. Note that this happens also for cases
in which optimal consumption in the absence of habit formation is monotonically decreasing; in
our case this occurs for  between 0.02 (the benchmark value of r) and 0.035.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 5 shows that a higher value of the risk aversion parameter 
 { or equivalently a lower
value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1=
 { leads to lower consumption early in life
and higher consumption late in life with the consumption hump occurring later in life.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 6 illustrates the optimal consumption prole for three dierent values of the time hori-
zon T. Since we x the initial wealth and disregard labor income, the agent with a longer horizon
consumes at a lower level throughout life. The consumption hump occurs earlier for longer horizons.
For a suciently short horizon (about 42 years or shorter, given the other parameter values) the
consumption path is monotonically increasing over life.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Finally, we consider the relevance of the strength of the bequest motive as represented by the
parameter ", cf. the preference specication in (4). We have used a benchmark value of " = 0
corresponding to no utility of bequest, which obviously implies that the agent consumes everything
and ends up with zero wealth. In Figure 7 we compare the benchmark consumption prole with
the consumption prole when " is either one thousand or one million. In the rst of these two
cases, the agent leaves a bequest of 1.035 (compare with the initial wealth of 20) which corresponds
to roughly the consumption in the nal 1.5 years. In the latter case, the agent leaves a bequest
of 5.294 corresponding to the consumption over the nal 8-9 years. Naturally, we see that the
stronger the bequest weight ", the lower the consumption throughout life as more savings need to
13be generated. However, the shape of the consumption prole and the location of the consumption
hump are only aected slightly. The hump occurs after 20.3 years without bequest, after 20.1 years
when " = 1000, and after 19.4 years when " = 1000000.
[Figure 7 about here.]
An interesting observation from the gures presented above is that, after the mid-life hump and
subsequent decline, optimal consumption starts to increase again in the nal years of life. However,
this behavior depends on the constellation of parameter values. Figure 8 shows an optimal con-
sumption path with no increase near the end, based on a set of reasonable parameter values. In this
particular case, the slope of the consumption path becomes less negative so that the consumption
path 
attens out near the end. It appears to be impossible to provide a simple analytical charac-
terization of the shape of the optimal consumption path just before the terminal date. Intuitively,
as the terminal date approaches, the agent becomes less concerned about the impact of current
consumption on future habit levels as the future is becoming increasingly irrelevant. Therefore, the
dampening eect of internal habit formation on consumption weakens as the nal date approaches.
Of course, even in the nal years, the agent has to cope with the current minimum consumption
level caused by past consumption decisions. Therefore, the optimal consumption decision of the
agent with internal habit formation does not approach the optimal decision of an agent with con-
stant relative risk aversion, but rather the optimal consumption of an agent with an external habit
or subsistence consumption level. In the larger picture, the optimal consumption pattern (late) in
retirement is heavily in
uenced by the increase in mortality risk ignored by our simple model.
[Figure 8 about here.]
The key empirical papers documenting the hump consider consumption only up to about age 65,
and their graphs indicate that consumption 
attens out in the years leading up to that age, cf., e.g.,
Figure 1 in Feigenbaum (2008). This appears consistent with the 
attening of the consumption
path in the nal years in our Figure 8 or with the relatively 
at part of the consumption path in, say,
Figure 1 just before the nal few years of increasing consumption. The limited existing empirical
evidence on consumption in retirement is inconclusive with respect to how consumption varies with
age late in retirement, cf., e.g., Fisher, Johnson, Marchand, Smeeding, and Torrey (2005).3
3In contrast, there is substantial empirical evidence that consumption typically falls at retirement, but this should
be seen in relation to frequently occurring contemporaneous changes in leisure, housing, health conditions, mortality
risk, and household composition, cf., e.g., the discussion in Browning and Crossley (2001).
146 Calibrating the model to consumption data
In this section we investigate the extent to which our model can match the observed consumption
hump. We apply consumption data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey from the United States
over the period 1980-2003. The data was originally processed and used by Krueger and Perri (2006)
and it is made available online by the authors.4 The consumption is de
ated back to represent
\1982-84 constant dollars." We apply their so-called ND+ consumption measure; we refer the reader
to Krueger and Perri (2006) for details on the data. The consumption data is on a household basis,
whereas our model is better suited for individuals. We focus on the consumption of singles and
the per-person consumption of couples without children (household consumption divided by 1.7 as
recommended by the OECD equivalence scale). The uneven curves in Figure 9 show the average
consumption per year in thousands of US dollars for individuals at dierent ages who are living
either as singles (upper panel) or in childless couples (lower panel). The consumption of singles
is relatively 
at over life, but still higher in mid-life than in the early and in the late years. The
consumption of couples exhibits a more pronounced hump-shape.
[Figure 9 about here.]
We calibrate our model so that the optimal consumption path from the model best matches
the observed age-prole of consumption of either singles or couples. Since the consumption data
covers ages from 25 to 65, we let t = 0 and T = 40. We x the risk-free rate at r = 0:01 and
assume no utility from bequeathing wealth (" = 0). We search for the remaining parameters with
the objective of minimizing the sum of the squared dierences between the model consumption and
the observed average consumption at ages 25;26;:::;65. Table 2 shows the parameter values from
the calibrations. The habit process parameters  and  have very reasonable values. We restrict
 to be at least 0.1, which is a binding constraint in the calibration to the consumption of singles.
As long as the dierence     is xed, we can also obtain an excellent t to the data for higher
values of  and . The time preference rate  is restricted to be at most 0.25. A slightly better
t can be obtained by increasing  further (together with the risk aversion parameter 
). On the
other hand, we also obtain a good t to the data if we lower both  and 
 (results are available on
request). When comparing the value of the initial wealth to real-life wealth levels, recall that the
model wealth includes any human capital.
4Web-link: http://www.fperri.net/research_data.htm
15[Table 2 about here.]
The smooth curves in Figure 9 depict the life-cycle consumption pattern from our calibrated
model. The gure illustrates that our parsimonious model driven by impatience and habit for-
mation nicely matches the observed consumption pattern over the life-cycle including the mid-life
consumption hump. Our calibration is mostly challenged by the apparent substantial increase in
the consumption of persons of an age between, say, 30 and 45 years who live in a childless couple.
However, this pattern may be partially explained by a \survivorship" bias in the sample. Obvi-
ously, when the persons in a couple become parents, they leave this group of individuals and their
subsequent consumption is not re
ected by the data we use. If the less wealthy and therefore low-
consuming couples are more inclined to become parents, the remaining sample of childless couples
is tilted towards the more wealthy and high-consuming individuals.
7 Conclusion
This paper proposes a new potential explanation of the empirically observed hump in the consump-
tion of individuals over their life cycle. If the preferences of the individual exhibit habit formation,
the hump can naturally materialize from a tradeo between impatience and concerns about the
eects of current consumption on future habit levels and thus future minimum consumption. The
habit concerns cause a large reduction in the otherwise very high consumption early in life, but a
smaller reduction of the otherwise medium-sized consumption in mid life. In some circumstances,
a hump-shaped consumption path emerges.
We present a set of sucient conditions for the presence of a hump and characterize the age at
which the hump occurs. Numerical examples illustrate the consumption hump and the sensitivity
of the optimal consumption path to the values of key parameters of our model. We show that our
parsimonious model provides a nice match with consumption patterns derived from the 1980-2003
Consumer Expenditure Surveys in the United States.
As the purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that habit formation can generate a consumption
hump, we deliberately keep our model simple and, in particular, disregard uncertainty, labor income,
portfolio constraints etc. However, the basic tradeo identied in this paper carries over to more
elaborate settings.
16A Proof of Theorem 1
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation associated with the utility maximization problem (6)
is
0 = max
c

1
1   

(c   h)
1 
 + Jt + rxJx   cJx   J + (c   h)Jh

; (26)
where we have suppressed the arguments of the functions and where subscripts on J indicate partial
derivatives. The terminal condition is
J(T;x;h) = "U(x) =
"
1   

x1 
: (27)
The rst-order condition is
 Jx + (c   h) 
 + Jh = 0 , c = h + (Jx   Jh)
  1

: (28)
The second-order condition is satised by concavity of the utility function. After substituting the
rst-order condition back into the HJB equation and simplifying, we see that J should satisfy the
partial dierential equation (PDE)
0 =


1   

(Jx   Jh)
1  1

 + Jt + rxJx   hJx   J + (   )hJh: (29)
We conjecture that
J(t;x;h) =
1
1   

g(t)
 (x   hA(t))
1 

for some deterministic functions g and A. The relevant derivatives are
Jt =  Ath(x   hA) 
g
 +


1   

(x   hA)1 
g
 1gt;
Jx = (x   hA) 
g
; Jh =  A(x   hA) 
g
:
By substituting the derivatives into the rst-order condition (28), we obtain
c = h +
 
(x   hA) 
g
 + A(x   hA) 
g
 1=
 = h +
x   hA
g
(1 + A)
 1=
 : (30)
17After substitution of the derivatives, the PDE (29) can be written as
0 = hg
(x   hA) 
 [ At + (r +    )A   1]
+


1   

g
 1(x   hA)1 


gt  
1


( + (
   1)r)g + (1 + A)
1  1



;
(31)
which is satised if A and g satisfy the ordinary dierential equations (ODEs)
At = (r +    )A   1; gt =
1


( + (
   1)r)g   (1 + A)
1  1

:
Because of the terminal condition (27), we also need A(T) = 0 and g(T) = "1=
. It is straightforward
to verify that these conditions and the above ODEs are indeed satised when the functions A and
g are given by (7) and (9), respectively.
B Proof of Theorem 2
From (10), we can write
(t) = (X(t)   h(t)A(t))H(t); H(t) =
(1 + A(t))
  1


g(t)
:
Straightforward dierentiation leads to
0(t) =
 
X0(t)   h0(t)A(t)   h(t)A0(t)

H(t) + (X(t)   h(t)A(t))H0(t)
=
 
rX(t)   c(t)   [c(t)   h(t)]A(t)   h(t)[rAA(t)   1]

H(t) + (t)
H0(t)
H(t)
=
 
rX(t)   c(t)   c(t)A(t)   h(t)[(r   )A(t)   1]

H(t) + (t)
H0(t)
H(t)
= r
 
X(t)   h(t)A(t)

H(t)   (c(t)   h(t))(1 + A(t))H(t) + (t)
H0(t)
H(t)
= (t)

r   (1 + A(t))H(t) +
H0(t)
H(t)

;
18where we have used X0(t) = rX(t)   c(t) and h0(t) = c(t)   h(t), as well as A0(t) = rAA(t)   1.
By further applying that g0(t) = rgg(t)   (1 + A(t))
1  1

, we obtain
H0(t) =  



(1 + A(t))
  1

 1A0(t)
g(t)
  (1 + A(t))
  1

 g0(t)
g(t)2
=  



rAA(t)   1
1 + A(t)
H(t)   rg
(1 + A(t))
  1


g(t)
+ (1 + A(t))
 
(1 + A(t))
  1


g(t)
!2
=



B(t)H(t)   rgH(t) + (1 + A(t))H(t)2;
where we have introduced
B(t) =
1   rAA(t)
1 + A(t)
:
Going back to the derivative of the surplus consumption, we get
0(t) = (t)

r   (1 + A(t))H(t) +



B(t)   rg + (1 + A(t))H(t)

= (t)

r   rg +



B(t)

= (t)
1


(r    + B(t))
= (t)(t);
where
(t) =
r    + B(t)


:
Since c(t) = h(t) + (t) by denition, we obtain
c0(t) = h0(t) + 0(t)
= (c(t)   h(t)) + (t)(t)
= ( + (t))(t) + (   )c(t);
which completes the proof.
C Proof of Theorem 3
Note that when Assumption 1 and (21) hold, we have  > 0 (since 
 > 0),  > , and  > 1.
19The solution to (19) is clearly
~ (t) = ~ 0e t;
and the solution to (20) is
~ c(t) = (~ c0   ~ 0)e ( )t + ~ 0e t
as can be veried by straightforward dierentiation.
Observe that
~ c0(0) = (   )~ 0 + (   )~ c0 = (   )~ c0   (   )~ h0;
which is positive because of the assumption in (22). On the other hand, we can write
~ c0(t) = e t

(   )(~ 0   ~ c0)e (  )t   ~ 0

: (32)
Because of Assumption 1 and (21), the rst term in the brackets approaches zero as t ! 1, since
       > 0, and the second term ~ 0 is positive. Therefore, ~ c0(t) < 0 for large enough t.
Because ~ c0(t) is a smooth function with ~ c0(0) > 0 and ~ c0(t) < 0 for large enough t, there must
be at least one point tH for which ~ c0(tH) = 0. The condition ~ c0(tH) = 0 implies that
(   )(~ 0   ~ c0)e ( )tH = ~ 0e tH;
where both sides of the equality are positive due to the parameter conditions. Hence, the solution
is
tH =
1
      
ln
 
(   )(~ 0   ~ c0)
~ 0
!
=
ln(   )   ln() + ln

1   ~ c0
(~ c0 ~ h0)

      
:
This is the only solution to ~ c0(tH) = 0 since the term in the brackets in (32) is a decreasing function
of t. Combining this with the above observation that ~ c0(t) < 0 for large enough t, it becomes clear
that ~ c(t) is hump-shaped, i.e., increasing from t = 0 up to t = tH where it attains its maximum
and then decreasing for t > tH.
20D Proof of Lemma 1
Dene f(t) = c(t)   ~ c(t) and note that f(0) = 0. From (16) and (20), we get
df(t) = [( + (t))(t)   (   )~ (t)]dt + [(   )c(t)   (   )~ c(t)]dt
= [( + (t))((t)   ~ (t)) + ((t) + )~ (t)]dt + (   )f(t)dt:
Noting that ~ (s) = ~ 0e s, we can write the solution as
f(t) =
Z t
0
e ( )(t s)
h
( + (s))((s)   ~ (s)) + ((s) + )~ (s)
i
ds
= ~ 0
Z t
0
e ( )(t s)e s

( + (s))

(s)
~ (s)
  1

+ ((s) + )

ds:
From (21) and Assumption 1, we know that  >  and  > 0. Furthermore,
(s)
~ (s)
=
0e
R t
0 (s)ds
~ 0e s = e
R t
0((s)+)ds;
where we apply ~ 0 = 0 which follows from assuming ~ h0 = h0 and ~ c0 = c0. For any  > 0 we can
nd a ~ T > 0 big enough that j(s) + j <  for all s 2 [0;t] if T > ~ T. Moreover, since
 + (s) =     +



B(s);
it follows from (21) and Assumption 1 that  + (s) > 0 and
 + (s)      +



B(t); s 2 [0;t]:
Putting this together, we nd that
jf(t)j  ~ 0
Z t
0

(    +



B(t))
 
et   1

+ 

ds = t~ 0

(    +



B(t))
 
et   1

+ 

:
Note that the right-hand side is increasing in t, which implies that
jf(s)j  t~ 0

(    +



B(t))
 
et   1

+ 

; s 2 [0;T]:
21If we decrease  from positive values towards zero, the right-hand side in this inequality decreases
towards zero. Hence, for any given  > 0, we can nd a small enough  > 0 and therefore a
corresponding big enough ~ T so that
jf(s)j < ; s 2 [0;T]:
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26Parameter Description Value
 time preference rate 0.05

 risk aversion parameter 4
" preference weight of bequest 0
 habit scaling parameter 0.3
 habit persistence parameter 0.4
X0 nancial wealth 20
h0 initial habit level 0.25
r risk-free rate 0.02
T remaining life time 50
Table 1: Benchmark parameter values. The table lists the parameter values used in the
numerical examples unless otherwise noted.
Parameter Description Consumption data
Singles Couples
 time preference rate 0.250 0.250

 risk aversion parameter 4.423 5.945
 habit scaling parameter 0.100 0.124
 habit persistence parameter 0.124 0.163
X0 nancial wealth (kUSD) 438.2 442.2
h0 initial habit level (kUSD) 1.049 0.000
Table 2: Parameter values from calibration. The table shows the set of parameter values
giving the best t to the consumption data considered, both for the consumption of singles and the
per-person consumption of couples. The data is taken from the webpage http://www.fperri.
net/research_data.htm of Fabrizio Perri and generated by Krueger and Perri (2006) from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey over the period 1980-2003. The calibration objective is to minimize
the sum of the squared dierences between the model consumption and the observed average
consumption at ages 25;26;:::;65. We impose the restrictions   0:25 and   0:1.
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Figure 1: Consumption in the benchmark case. The dark, thick curve shows the optimal
consumption path. The pale, thick curve shows the corresponding path of the habit level. The
thin curve depicts the consumption path based on the approximate, long-horizon dynamics. These
curves are generated using the benchmark parameter values listed in Table 1. The downward-
sloping curve shows the optimal consumption path for the case without habit formation. This
curve is drawn using the same parameters, except that h0 =  =  = 0.
280
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0 1 02 03 04 05 0
C
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
Time in years
alpha=0.28 alpha=0.3 alpha=0.32
Figure 2: Consumption for dierent values of the habit scaling parameter . For all
other parameters the benchmark values listed in Table 1 are used.
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Figure 3: Consumption for dierent values of the habit persistence parameter . For
all other parameters the benchmark values listed in Table 1 are used.
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Figure 4: Consumption for dierent values of the time preference rate . For all other
parameters the benchmark values listed in Table 1 are used.
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Figure 5: Consumption for dierent values of the risk aversion parameter 
. Recall
that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is proportional to 1=
. For all other parameters
the benchmark values listed in Table 1 are used.
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Figure 6: Consumption for dierent values of the time horizon T. For all other param-
eters the benchmark values listed in Table 1 are used.
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Figure 7: Consumption for dierent values of the bequest parameter ". For all other
parameters the benchmark values listed in Table 1 are used.
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Figure 8: Consumption with no increase in the nal years. The dark, thick curve shows
the optimal consumption path when  = 0:1, 
 = 2,  = 0:15,  = 0:2, whereas benchmark values
are used for the remaining parameter values as listed in Table 1.
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Figure 9: Consumption path from model calibrated to consumption data. The graphs
show annual consumption per person in thousands of dollars de
ated to re
ect 1982-84 constant
dollars. The uneven curve in the upper panel re
ects average consumption per year of singles at
dierent ages. The uneven curve in the lower panel shows the average per-person consumption per
year of childless couples at dierent ages. Data is taken from the webpage http://www.fperri.
net/research_data.htm of Fabrizio Perri and generated by Krueger and Perri (2006) from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey over the period 1980-2003. The smooth curve in each panel is the
consumption pattern in our model calibrated to the data in the way explained in the text.
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